prevents the borrower from fully committing not to increase risk ex post, even though the efficiency gains from such a precommitment give the borrower an incentive to do so.
Efficiency is enhanced if covenants are renegotiable as time passes, allowing the borrower to take advantage of profitable new opportunities otherwise forbidden by debt contracts. 3 Because bondholders are large in number and private lenders few, bondholders are effectively unable to get together to renegotiate terms, especially in nondistress situations, whereas private lenders are easily able to renegotiate. Material covenants therefore appear only in private debt contracts, and public debt is not involved in renegotiations because it has none of the control rights that covenants provide. In many renegotiations, the borrower and private lenders make decisions that involve expropriation of wealth from the bondholders. 4 In our model, changes in the firm's investment strategy and associated effects on firm value are irreversible. Exploiting covenant incompleteness by increasing risk after debt issuance influences the terms of bargaining if a firm later seeks a covenant waiver and may remove some new opportunities from the feasible set. Thus, a firm may refrain from exploiting lenders early if the associated reduction in expected value of later opportunities is large enough.
The exploitability of public debtholders -their willingness to act as a "punching bag" -is a component of expected value, and the mix of public and private debt in the capital structure affects the size of this component. Thus, by varying the mix, a borrower can adjust its ex post incentives in a manner that allows it to effectively precommit not to increase risk. In the central tradeoff of our model, the borrower weighs the expected benefits of exploiting all lenders by increasing risk early against the benefits of expropriating wealth from public bondholders later. 5 3 Theoretical and empirical papers bearing on the relationship between covenants and monitoring include Berlin and Loeys (1988) , Berlin and Mester (1992) , Rajan and Winton (1995) , Gorton and Kahn (2000) , Press (1993,1995) , Gilson and Warner (1996) , Kwan and Carleton (1993) , and Smith and Warner (1979) . The theoretical papers argue that private debt covenants, monitoring and renegotiation are closely linked. The empirical papers demonstrate that private debt is frequently renegotiated and that it includes more and tighter covenants than publicly-issued bonds. 4 In reality, loan contracts contain a relatively small number of rather broadly specified covenants, restricting classes of events (e.g., asset sales, mergers) or financial performance (e.g., minimum interest coverage ratios). Very detailed restrictions are omitted not only because of high contracting costs, but also because measures used in covenants must be both observable and verifiable in court and because very detailed covenants would lead to nearly continuous renegotiations. Public debt contains fewer and less restrictive covenants than private debt. However, both public and private lenders benefit from loan covenants' risk restrictions. See Berlin and Mester (1992) , Carey, Prowse, Rea and Udell (1992) , Gilson and Warner (1996) , Nash, Netter and Poulson (1997) , and Kahan and Tuckman (1993) . 5 Maturity differences of public and private debt play a key role in some models. We abstract from differences in debt maturity, but what is important to our results is that private debt not be very shortterm. In that case, covenants are irrelevant because the private lender gains control at each renewal date.
A stylized example helps make the ideas more concrete. Consider a manufacturing firm in an industry with evolving production technologies and variable demand. The firm both issues public debt and takes out a bank loan to finance a new plant. Without violating its debt covenants, the firm has opportunities to add risk beneficial to it but not to lenders. For example, lenders might want the firm to use a proven technology in the new plant. However, after issuing debt, the firm may spend some of its cash to alter the plant to employ a promising but unproven process. Debt covenants that could prevent such an action would have to be so detailed as to be infeasible. Or similarly, the firm might use some of its cash to finance larger inventories, increasing its payoff in high demand states but also the risk of distress in low demand states. Extremely tight covenant restrictions on inventories are costly because normal inventory fluctuations would lead to very frequent contract renegotiations. Both the process change and the inventory change are inefficient because they would reduce the firm's total NPV, its cash balances, and its future flexibility, but the returns to shareholders may be enhanced by the actions because lenders bear a large fraction of the downside risk.
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In addition to having opportunities to increase risk just after debt issuance, the firm foresees a variety of opportunities arising over time with some probability. For example, acquisition of a supplier, a competitor, or another production facility might become possible, or a favorable opportunity to buy back stock might arise. However, actions such as these are likely to violate loan covenants. Especially where actions increase risk, the firm must compensate the bank in order to obtain a covenant waiver (because its bonds have few covenants, the firm seldom has to compensate bondholders). Thus, the net expected value of such opportunities is a function of capital structure -less private debt means less compensation paid to lenders and more wealth transferred from bondholders.
By increasing risk after debt issuance, the firm decreases the net expected value of future opportunities because its resources and flexibility are reduced. For example, if the firm increases inventories and later needs a covenant waiver in order to make an acquisition, the firm must compensate the bank for both the acquisition risk and the inventory risk. Moreover, because the extra inventory risk is inefficient, the firm has less total NPV to serve as a basis for refinancing.
In reality, corporate loan agreements generally feature original maturities of three to five years, so our implicit assumption that private debt is not all short-term is realistic. 6 The firm would like to commit not to take any such risk-increasing actions because lenders would then accept a lower interest rate, but no cost-effective contractual precommitment mechanism exists.
If future opportunities are sufficiently valuable, the firm will choose not to increase risk just after debt issuance because the associated reduction in expected value of future opportunities will outweigh the immediate gains from exploiting all lenders. As noted, the firm can influence its incentives by its ex ante choice of capital structure because the mix of public and private debt influences the expected value of future opportunities. Thus, the firm can use its debt mix to help it precommit not to take risk early when contractual commitment is infeasible.
The use of public debt as a punching bag does not lead to a first-best, complete-contracting equilibrium because public debt has efficiency costs as well as benefits. Although early NPVreducing project shifts can be discouraged, the ability to exploit public debtholders offers incentives to undertake some NPV-reducing projects should they become available late in the game. Public debt is used only when the expected efficiency losses associated with such projects are smaller than the expected losses from any early exploitation of all lenders. In general, the optimal mix of public and private debt is a function of the opportunities open to the firm and of the tightness of the choice set to which the firm can be restricted by private debt covenants. Public debt increases as covenants allow the borrower more leeway to switch to a "bad" project early in the game. However, tightening covenants by requiring lender permission for a larger fraction of "new" projects or for less risky "new" projects also increases the share of public debt in the capital structure. That is, loose covenants in one sense and tight covenants in another both point toward more public debt.
As in models predicated on asymmetric information, in our view it is the widely held nature of public debt that separates it from private debt. However, in our model, diffuse ownership amounts to a commitment not to renegotiate rather than a commitment not to be informed. By allowing themselves to be exploited in certain circumstances, bondholders make it possible for the firm to effectively precommit not to succumb to value-destroying moral hazard. Public debtholders are unhappy ex post when their wealth is expropriated but are compensated for that risk ex ante (all markets are perfectly competitive in our model).
Our model applies best to financing decisions of relatively large corporations. Factors such as large fixed costs of issuance or private information may account for the fact that small firms almost never issue public debt, and thus are unable to employ the efficiency-enhancing capital structure strategies modeled here. In addition, intuition and some of the evidence we offer implies
that the forces we model may operate weakly for extremely low-risk firms, say those rated A or better by Moody's or Standard & Poor's. Such firms are so far from default that moral hazard risk borne by lenders over a period of even several years may be modest, and thus for such firms variations in the debt mix may not have large effects on firm value. However, such firms are relatively few in number (using Moody's data on U.S. nonfinancial firms, over 90 percent of all rated firms are Baa or worse).
Our model conforms to practitioner conventional wisdom about debt decisions, which is limited in scope. Practitioners tend to divide firms into those with and without "access" to public debt markets, and those firms with such access are simply described as issuing the form of debt that is least costly at the time of issuance. 7 We model only firms with access, and our model accords well with the idea of borrowing cost minimization because a firm with a suboptimal debt mix must pay higher interest rate spreads to banks, bondholders, or both.
Papers presenting empirical evidence on the mix of public and private debt include Houston and James (1996) , Hadlock and James (1997) , Cantillo and Wright (1995) , Johnson (1997) , and Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) . These papers show that the debt mix is affected by many factors, including the size of the firm and its riskiness. Firms that are smaller, more leveraged, with lower market-to-book ratios, and in less research-intensive industries tend to use more bank debt. These results are broadly consistent with the predictions of our model.
We present new empirical evidence that supports our model and is at least partially inconsistent with other existing explanations. Our model implies a negative cross-sectional relationship between the proportion of debt that is private and secondary market bond spreads, and we test for and find such a relationship. To our knowledge, this is the first available evidence relating the debt mix to debt prices. Our model also implies that, other things equal, a borrower posing greater moral hazard risk for lenders has more public debt and less private debt. We estimate regression models of the private debt share, similar to Houston and James (1996) and Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) but with some new variables that help isolate moral hazard, and find results consistent with our model. We present evidence that bond spreads on average are higher than loan spreads, also consistent with our model and inconsistent with some others. Ours is the only model of which we are aware that is consistent with all the formal evidence.
The remainder of the paper is in five parts. Section 1 presents the model and Section 2 discusses comparative statics. Section 3 comments on robustness and presents evidence about 7 We are not aware of any theoretical or empirical research that explains the equilibrium determinants of access.
relative loan and bond maturities and interest rate spreads. Section 4 offers regression evidence, and Section 5 has concluding remarks.
The model

Setup
A risk-neutral firm makes financing and project-choice decisions at four dates (see Figure 1 for the time line). Debt contracts are signed at date 0 and mature at date 3. 8 There is no early liquidation (in contrast to, e.g., Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992; and Sharpe, 1990) , but private debt contracts may be restructured at date 2. All information is public at all dates.
At date 0, the firm chooses α ∈ [0,1], the fraction of debt raised from private lenders (a "bank loan"). The remainder of the debt is obtained by a public issue ("bonds"). 9 Conditional on the debt choice, banks and the public market set interest rates R g on the loan and P on the bonds, respectively. The two debt markets are competitive: Banks and public bondholders earn in expectation the risk-free interest rate, here assumed to be zero.
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At date 1, the firm chooses between two projects, the good project and the bad project. The good project returns X g at date 3 with probability θ g and zero otherwise while the bad project returns X b at date 3 with probability θ b and zero otherwise. Assume that the good project is safer than the bad project (θ g > θ b ) and that it has a higher expected return (θ g X g > θ b X b ), but that the return is higher on a successful bad project than on a successful good project (X b > X g ). The firm may prefer the bad project because interest rates are fixed at date 0, so adding risk reduces the firm's expected cost of debt and increases its expected return. To ensure moral hazard is a potential problem, assume that the firm would choose the bad project if it had to select between the good project and the bad project at interest rates set in anticipation of the firm choosing the good project. That is,
Although there is no asymmetric information, contracts are incomplete in that date 0 debt contracts cannot be made conditional on the date 1 choice between the good and bad project. 8 The maturity of debt contracts is exogenous, but we argue later that long-term debt contracts are optimal in this model. 9 Expansion of the contract space to include equity is briefly discussed in section 3. 10 Banks and bondholders have the same cost of funds.
Contracts are incomplete because the firm's actions can legally be restrained only through covenants, and it is too difficult or costly to write covenants that limit the firm to a single project (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Berlin and Mester, 1992; and Williamson, 1975) . 11 Instead, covenants restrict the firm to some set of projects. Both the good and bad projects are in this set.
The firm may have an opportunity to switch to a new investment project at date 2. Some new projects are permissible under the existing loan contract, whereas others would violate the covenants of the bank loan but not of the public debt contract. 12 We focus on new projects that violate covenants (those that do not are implicitly included in the returns to the good and bad projects). That is, we assume that to undertake a new project, the firm would need to renegotiate its contract with the bank but not with public debtholders.
With probability ρ, the firm receives a new project that violates loan covenants. Assume that the new project poses higher risk but offers potentially higher returns than the original project. If the firm selects the good project at date 1, then the new project returns X ng with probability θ ng and zero otherwise, where θ ng < θ g and X ng is drawn from a uniform distribution between X g and X g + Y.
13 Similarly, if the firm chooses the bad project at date 1, then the new project returns X nb with probability θ nb and zero otherwise, where θ b -θ nb = θ g -θ ng and X nb is drawn from a uniform distribution between X b and X b + Y. Thus, the incremental risk and the range of potential extra return contributed by new projects is independent of the firm's choice between good and bad projects at date 1. Contracts may be incomplete for other reasons. Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993) show how incomplete contracts can help firms use reputational capital. 12 Gilson and Warner (1996) and Nash, Netter and Poulson (1997) offer evidence that bond covenants are much less restrictive than loan covenants. 13 The possibility that the new project involves moral hazard is included in the risk and expected return of the project. 14 Such independence is most natural when the new project is viewed as an add-on. Where the new project is viewed as replacing the old project, the firm would sell the old to obtain part of the financing for the new and, since the good project has higher NPV than the bad project, a choice of the bad project would reduce the scale of the new project since the bad project would return less than the good in an openmarket sale. In this case, the return X ng differs from X nb by a scale factor rather than by the difference X ng -X nb.
net of increased payments to the bank, exceeds the net return from keeping the good project. With public debt in the capital structure, the firm chooses some NPV-reducing new projects to the left of the curved line because public debtholders are not compensated for greater risk. We consider a range of new projects rather than a single one in order to allow public debt to be associated with both NPV-reducing and NPV-enhancing choices.
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To make the new project relevant, assume that the best new project is sufficiently better than the good project:
This condition ensures that efficiency is enhanced by preserving the option to undertake the new project because there are enough NPV-enhancing new projects to counteract the ex ante losses from switching to NPV-reducing new projects. If (A2) is violated, the firm always switches to the bad project and the equilibrium involves no public debt. In this case, the inability to write complete contracts leads to an especially suboptimal outcome.
Renegotiation consists of the firm offering the bank a new interest rate that earns the bank a zero expected return, and the bank agreeing to any change. This gives bargaining power in an equilibrium restructuring to the firm. 16 Renegotiation does not affect the interest rate on the public bonds. Thus, the firm and bank may agree to permit some projects with a smaller NPV than the original, good project because the gain from reducing expected payments to bondholders exceeds the loss in expectation from switching to the new project.
Finally, all projects are completed at date 3 and debtholders are repaid if possible. 15 For simplicity, we exclude new projects in the upper quadrants of Figure 2 from the set of possible new projects. Additions to the set that are in the upper right quadrant are isomorphic to an increase in Y. Such projects have lower risk and higher payoff than the original project. Adding new projects in the upper left quadrant can be similar to either an increase or a decrease in Y. Those to the left of the dotted line are not relevant, but those to the right and close to the dotted line tend to reduce the value added by public debt. In this region, the return on a successful new project is less than the return on a successful original project, so the firm will shift to such new projects only if the lenders agree to reduce interest rates. Since bondholders are incapable of such renegotiations, some NPV-enhancing new projects are made infeasible by the presence of public debt in the capital structure. If the proportion of new projects with such properties is large enough, a corner solution obtains in which public debt is not used, just as a corner solution obtains if Y is too small. 16 We assume that restructuring after the bad project is chosen also leaves the bank with a zero expected overall return. Assuming that the firm can retain the value of the initially mispriced interest rate when it moves to a new project from the bad project gives qualitatively similar results.
Solution to the model
To solve the model, we work backwards from the date 2 decisions. For convenience, we initially ignore the bad project and assume that the firm has selected the good project at date 1.
Also assume the firm has access to a new project at date 2 and must choose whether to renegotiate.
If the new project is selected, the new interest rate is R n and firm profit is
If the good project is kept, firm profit is
Let X g * be the gross return on a successful new project such that the firm is indifferent between the new and good projects. Then,
For all X ng < X g *, the firm retains the old project while for all X ng ≥ X g *, the firm changes to the new project. The project cutoff X g * is such that θ ng X g * < θ g X g whenever α < 1.
The expected return to the firm given that it chooses the good project at date 1 is thus
This can be integrated to get the expected return, but there is an easier way. Since the firm has all the bargaining power, it gets the entire surplus from the projects it chooses. Thus, its expected return is
The first term is the expected payoff in the event no new project is available plus the expected payoff in the event that one is available but not chosen (which occurs when X g * > X ng ); the second term of (2) is the expected payoff when the new project is available and chosen. Note that X g * is a function of P and α.
To find the interest rate on public debt (P) given the share of bank debt α and our temporary working assumption that the firm chooses the good project, solve
Integrating and substituting for X* using (1) gives
This quadratic in P is solved by
where
LEMMA 1: Public bond interest rates are decreasing in the share of bank debt:
Intuitively, the gains to the firm from switching to a new project are the sum of the change in project expected returns and the reduction in expected payments to bondholders. As bank loans become a larger fraction of the firm's debt structure, the reduction in bondholder payments falls, making fewer negative net present value new projects worthwhile.
Recalling that the maintained assumption to this point is that the firm has chosen the good project at date 1, combining results gives:
Given that the firm is committed to not selecting the bad project, the firm chooses to have all bank debt and no public debt: d dV g ≥ 0 for all α, with strict equality only at α = 1.
PROOF: See Appendix A.
If the bad project did not exist, the optimal mix of debt would involve nothing but bank debt. This is not surprising, since having all bank debt leads to date 2 project choice efficiency: when α = 1, θ ng X g * = θ g X g and no NPV-reducing new projects are chosen.
Turning to the choice between the good and bad projects at date 1, in making its decision, the firm compares the expected value of the bad project with the expected value of the good project, including the option value of the new project in both cases. Because the interesting cases are incentive-compatible equilibria that involve some moral hazard, we focus on cases where lenders set date-zero interest rates in the belief that the firm chooses the good project at date 1. 17 In such cases, (2) gives the value of the strategy of choosing the good project. The firm's profit on the bad project if no new project is chosen is
Assuming debtholders expect the firm to choose the good project,
The last term represents the added value from the underpriced bank interest rate. We can follow the same process as for the good project to show that the value of choosing the bad project inclusive of the option to switch to a new project at date 2 is
The effect of moral hazard via underpriced bank interest rates is reflected in both (6) and (7). The firm retains the underpriced interest rate if it sticks with the bad project, which comes into the first term in (6), but this means that it is less likely to shift to the new project, as reflected in (7). That is, a choice of the bad project instead of the good project at date 1 amounts to a commitment to choose fewer new projects at date 2.
To find the equilibrium share of bank financing, we want to find the highest return conditional on the good project being an incentive compatible choice. In other words,
This leads to:
If the strategy of investing in the good project has a higher expected return than the bad project at α = 1 (i.e., V g ≥ V b ), then in equilibrium, the firm uses only bank financing. If Thus, the intersection is at the equilibrium mix of bank loans and bonds. This interior equilibrium is second best. If the firm could contractually commit to the good project, it would choose α=1 and achieve the first-best where V g is maximized. But for combinations of parameters yielding interior solutions, incomplete contracts prevent achievement of first best. Although the firm appears to reduce value by choosing α<1 rather than α=1, the value loss is less than that associated with a failure to credibly commit not to do the bad project. The lower dashed line in Figure 3 gives the return to the firm from choosing the bad project conditional on the market expecting the bad project. It lies below V g everywhere, illustrating the loss in value from moral hazard. (As noted, the V b functions shown previously are based on a presumption that the firm chooses the good project and are not relevant to equilibria in which it chooses the bad project. Thus, the firm cannot achieve the level of value indicated by the V b function at α=1: lenders know the firm would choose the bad project and thus would charge higher rates than those built into the V b function, yielding the return on the lower dashed line.)
Comparative Statics
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of equilibrium values to changes in the parameters. Qualitative results are robust to small changes in parameter values, and the direction of effects corresponds with intuition. Large changes to single parameters generally yield corner solutions, but changes that yield interior solutions have qualitative effects similar to those of small changes.
We examine the effects of changing both individual parameters and certain groups of parameters all at once. The latter is useful in examining the model's correspondence with the common intuition that riskier firms use more bank debt. This intuition appears based on empirical results involving overall risk rather than the specific moral hazard risk central to our model. The model behaves according to common intuition, and also as expected with regard to moral hazard risks.
There are generally three effects on equilibrium α of changing one parameter while holding all others constant: the direct effect of the parameter change on V g -V b , an indirect effect of the change on the cutoff returns below which new projects are not done (X g * and X b * ), and an indirect effect of the change on interest payments on the public debt (P).
These effects may point in opposite directions, and it is not possible to unambiguously sign most of the full comparative statics results, although the direct effects can be signed in most cases and appear representative. We produce full comparative statics results numerically, as described below.
Direct effects
We focus on the direct effect of parameter changes on V g -V b because increasing this difference results in a higher equilibrium α. Intuitively, when V g -V b rises, there is less gain from switching to the bad project for any level of private debt. Thus, the firm requires less of a public debt punching bag to forge a credible commitment to the good project. The following proposition
gives the direct effect of parameter changes on V g -V b :
PROPOSITION 3: Holding X g * , X b *, and P constant, the following are comparative static results:
When we also hold θ g X g constant, the following comparative static results hold:
Increasing θ g or X g , that is, adding value when the good project is selected (whether or not there is a later switch to a new project), usually leads to an increase in the equilibrium share of bank financing. These changes make it less attractive for the firm to switch to the bad project. Hence, less of a punching bag is needed. Adding value to the bad project by increasing θ b or X b has the opposite effect. Similarly, adding value to the new project increases the share of bank financing because the set of new projects that might be chosen over original projects is increased more when the original project is good than when it is bad.
Calibration and total comparative static results
In general, we cannot unambiguously sign the total (direct plus indirect) derivatives. We can, however, use numerical simulations to show how changes in parameters affect the equilibrium α.
As described in more detail in Appendix B and Table B -1, we set model parameters for our base case to be representative of a below-investment-grade firm with a Ba1 Moody's rating if it chooses the good project. The bad project is one full grade riskier (B1) and the new project one tick riskier (Ba2 following a good project). The other parameters in the base case are set to give reasonable returns. The simulation yields an equilibrium share of bank debt of 0.55, which is close to the median value of 0.51 found for large corporations with public debt by Houston and James (1996) .
Equilibrium interest rate spreads are also realistic. The third column of Panel A in Table 1 gives the baseline coefficient values used to establish the initial equilibrium. The changes in α, the share of private debt in total debt, given in the fifth column, are as predicted by derivatives for the direct effect. Derivatives for Y and ρ cannot be signed analytically and thus do not appear in Proposition 3, but numerical derivatives in Table 1 indicate that adding to the expected return from the new project by either making it better or more likely increases the share of bank financing.
The model's conformance to the common intuition that riskier firms use more bank debt cannot be assessed by looking at changes in project risk alone because such changes alter both the risk and the expected return of projects. Panel B of Table 1 Determining how to alter the riskiness of the firm by changing the new project is more complicated. We assume that a riskier firm is one for which the new project is less likely, but more rewarding when it is undertaken. Thus, we examine effects of changes in ρ when changes in either Y or the success probability of a new project are made to hold expected return constant. There are two issues here. First, changing θ ng has a different effect from changing Y because the former alters the ability to exploit public debtholders while the latter (to a first approximation) does not.
For this reason, we look at two ways to offset changes in ρ: first, by changes in θ ng and, second, by changes in Y. The second issue is that the amount by which either parameter must change to keep the expected gain from the equilibrium new project constant depends on X g *, which in turn depends on the equilibrium α. To simplify matters, we assume that either ρ θ ng is fixed or ρ (X g + Y) is fixed, as indicated in Table 1 . For both cases, an increase in the riskiness of the new project increases the share of bank financing.
Discussion: Tightness of the Covenants
The key tradeoff faced by the firm involves benefits of exploiting the moral hazard permitted by covenants versus expected benefits of future opportunities. Conceptually, a key determinant of the tradeoff is the "tightness" of covenants. For simplicity, assume that lenders care mainly about changes in risk when writing covenants, and that covenants are designed to limit the firm's ability to depart from the risk inherent in the good project. Variations in covenant tightness are then represented by variations in the "distance" between the good and bad projects (i.e., θ g -θ b ). As shown in the previous section, a widening of the good-bad distance by a reduction in θ b (a loosening of covenants) is associated with more public debt in the capital structure (holding expected return constant, see Panel B of Table 1 ). The less effective are covenants by themselves in restricting the firm's risk-taking, the more valuable are the complementary incentives offered by the presence of public debt.
Relationship of Comparative Static Results to Existing Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence on determinants of the debt mix is currently limited, and the key factor in our model, the tightness of covenants, is not included in extant studies. However, we suspect that tight covenants are more difficult to write for firms engaged in relatively large amounts of R&D.
Thus, our comparative statics result that decreases in θ b (holding expected return constant) are associated with less bank debt is consistent with Houston and James' (1996) finding that firms having relatively high R&D-to-sales ratios use less bank debt and more public debt. If one interprets Houston and James' leverage and coverage variables as cross-sectional controls for the risk and return of the "good" project, a high market-to-book ratio might be interpreted as an indicator that a firm is more likely to gain access to future "new" projects, that is, the firm has a high ρ. The findings of Houston and James and of Johnson (1997) that higher market-to-book is associated with less bank debt is then consistent with our findings that higher ρis associated with less bank debt (again holding expected return constant). Of course, these empirical results can also be interpreted as consistent with other models of debt mix choice, so an evaluation of the relative realism of extant models requires more evidence. We provide such evidence in Section 4.
Robustness of Model Results and Realism of Assumptions
In this section, we discuss the realism of assumptions and model results and the robustness of results to some variations in model structure.
Debt Maturity
We assume that no debt matures prior to the decision about whether to allow the new project.
This involves two subsidiary assumptions: that public debt is of longer maturity than private debt, and that private debt features at least a medium term to maturity at issuance. Very-short-term private debt is optimal in our model as written, and if it were permitted public debt would have no role because the bank would be able to exercise control over the borrower at each instant (as part of the loan renewal decision). However, the evidence just cited shows private debt usually has longer maturities. We suspect very short maturities are infrequently observed for large corporations because the recontracting costs of short-term debt exceed the moral hazard and renegotiation costs of longer-term private debt. If contracting costs are responsible, in our model we would expect that the maturity of debt would increase as the probability of a new project decreased (i.e. as an industry or firm matured), and this is consistent with anecdotal evidence that private debt maturities are shorter for smaller, younger firms. Note that we do not need all bank debt to be at least medium term, just some bank debt.
Long-term public debt is optimal because it allows firms and banks to use public debtholders as a punching bag, thereby improving efficiency. Although in our model it is important that the maturity of public debt at least equal that of private, the key feature of public debt is the lack of monitoring.
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19 From "Publicly Offered Corporate Bonds and Notes," 10/9/97, internal Federal Reserve Board table. 20 It is sometimes asserted that firms use public debt because it is both fixed rate and long term, allowing the rate to be locked in, but firms can obtain monitored, long-term, fixed-rate financing by issuing private placements.
Relative Interest Rate Spreads
Average differences between interest rate spreads on loans and bonds by the bond rating of the borrower for the years 1986-1993 are shown in Table 2 . To compute the differences, a matched sample of loans and bonds was constructed. For each loan, each of the borrower's outstanding bonds with a secondary market yield as of the contract date of the loan was located and the average secondary-market yield on Treasuries with remaining duration similar to that of the bond subtracted. This fixed-rate interest-rate spread was converted to a LIBOR basis comparable to that of the matched loan spread using the midpoint of spreads on standard three-year interest rate swaps. The mean of such bond spreads was then subtracted from the loan spread. Further details of measurement appear in Appendix C.
As shown in Table 2 , loan spreads are below comparable bond spreads for borrowers in all but the A grade, where loan and bond spreads are virtually identical. The differential is larger the riskier the borrower, probably because the frequency with which loans are secured increases with risk and relative spreads in part reflect the effective subordination of bondholders in the event of financial distress. However, if spread differences are adjusted for the value of collateral in distress using reasonable estimates of default probabilities and loss severities, loan spreads remain below bond spreads for all but the A-rated borrowers, where they remain about the same (not shown in the table) . On the whole, this evidence is quite inconsistent with conventional wisdom that interest costs are higher and loans and bonds, but is consistent with relative interest rate spreads produced by calibrated versions of this paper's model.
Equity
We assume that the debt-to-equity ratio is exogenous to the model. 21 However, it is not difficult to fit our model into many models of debt-equity choice without affecting the qualitative results. A natural extension is to add a debt-equity choice using the framework of agency cost models of leverage (Harris and Raviv, 1990; Jensen, 1986; and Stulz, 1990) . In these models, debt reduces the flexibility of managers to make investment decisions that do not promote shareholder value. In our model, it might correspond to increasing θ b or X b . Changes in the debt-equity ratio also would affect the relative size of the returns (all the X's). However, once the debt-equity allocation is made and the good, new, and bad projects are set our model goes through as above. A role for public debt as a punching bag remains because a conflict of interest between shareholders and lenders remains. We also expect that other aspects of the debt-equity choice involving asymmetric information, taxes, and market power can be laid over our model (for a discussion of such models, see Harris and Raviv, 1991) .
Distress
Our model assumes that, while covenants may be violated, there is never a reason to liquidate a firm early. As noted, we suspect that considerations related to financial distress, such as intercreditor conflicts, do affect the terms of some debt contracts and the equilibrium proportions of public and private debt, even for firms not actually in distress. We ignore such considerations mainly for simplicity and because the practical importance of distress imperfections is not clear for firms far from insolvency (which are most firms). Our consideration of nondistress renegotiations is important because many more loans are restructured outside of distress than under distress conditions (Kwan and Carleton, 1993) .
Some distress situations short of bankruptcy or liquidation can be analyzed in the context of our model. For example, one "opportunity" that might arise after debt issuance might be a drop in the firm's cash flow sufficient to cause a violation of leverage or interest coverage covenants in the loan. The firm must then compensate the bank in order to obtain a waiver, and such compensation is more expensive if the firm took actions that increased risk just after the loan was issued. The burden of such compensation is less the larger the share of public debt in the firm's capital structure because such debt rarely includes tight interest coverage or leverage restrictions.
Monitoring Cost
Introducing a monitoring cost does not affect the qualitative results of the model. A fixed or variable cost of monitoring borne by private but not public debtholders would reduce the equilibrium quantity of private debt. It would leave unchanged the use of public debt as a punching bag. Thus, the comparative static results would be unchanged.
Another cost that private debtholders might bear is a recontracting cost. This is a cost borne if and only if a new project is selected in the model. Again, this cost would not affect the qualitative effect of parameter changes on the share of bank debt. Introducing either type of monitoring cost, however, would increase the interest rate on private debt. Sufficiently large costs might reverse our result that private debt has a lower interest rate than public debt.
Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present empirical evidence supporting our model's predictions. First, we test and find support for an implicit prediction of the model, which is that observed secondarymarket interest rate spreads on bonds are negatively related to the share of private debt in total debt. Second, we test the model's prediction that, other things equal, firms posing greater moral hazard risks to lenders have a smaller share of private debt. We estimate a variant of conventional empirical models of the private debt share that sheds new light on the importance of moral hazard, and find that moral hazard has a significant effect on debt mix.
Data
The primary variable of interest in our model is the equilibrium share of private debt α. We measure α by combining data from the January 1999 Fitch Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) with Compustat data. The FISD has information about every registered bond issued by U.S. firms with an original maturity date later than January 1, 1990 as well as many Rule 144A
and medium term note (MTN) issues. Beginning in April 1995, the FISD also tracks events that affect the amount of each issue outstanding, such as calls, maturities, and sinking fund payments.
For each firm, we compute the amount of public debt outstanding for each fiscal year-end date after April 1995. We measure the share of private debt as the proportion of the firm's total debt that is not public debt (total debt is from Compustat). The resulting sample has 1497 firm-year observations, most falling in the years 1995-97, with mean and median values of α of 0.43 and 0.44, respectively. These values are similar to the values in Houston and James (1996 , Table V) and Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) .
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Interest rate spreads are estimated using the March 1998 release of the Lehman Fixed Income
Database, which has monthly corporate and U.S. Treasury bond price and yield information for 22 Our method yields a larger sample at lower cost than Houston and James' (1996) method of reading 10K footnotes to obtain debt structure, but our measure is likely to be noisier because CUSIP ID number problems sometimes cause relevant bonds to be missed (making measured α too high) and the FISD sometimes misses sinking fund payments or calls (measured α too low). In order to reduce the noise, we eliminate certain firms from the sample: Because the FISD's coverage of MTNs, Euroissues, and 144A issues is incomplete, we eliminate from the sample firms with any such bonds. We also eliminate firms with any zero-coupon or discount bonds outstanding because Computstat carries such bonds at current accreted value whereas the FISD uses the face value at maturity. We eliminate firms making their first public issue in 1995 or later, financial firms, and those with less than $10 million of public debt outstanding. We eliminate observations with measured α > 1.1 (prima facie evidence of significant FISD errors), and set other values greater than 1 to 1. many (not all) bonds. Individual corporate bond spreads are the difference between the corporate yield and an interpolated Treasury yield computed using the two contemporaneous on-the-run
Treasuries with durations bracketing that of the corporate bond. 23 As shown in Table 3 , the resulting sample has 652 total observations for 256 firms. The sample mean and median values of α are 0.40, similar to the values in the larger sample. Mean and median total assets of sample firms are $3.1 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively.
Empirical Relationship Between Spreads and the Share of Private Debt in Total Debt
Market participants typically offer a very reduced-form explanation for firms' debt decisions:
firms are said to choose the lowest-cost source of finance. In addition to offering little insight into why costs vary, such an hypothesis is nearly impossible to test directly because costs naturally depend on the proportions of public and private debt and because at best we observe pricing only for the mix the firm chooses, not for potential alternative choices.
Our model does not allow us to test for a relationship based on interest rates if firms
continually adjusted their debt mix to be at equilibrium values. However, as noted previously, we expect that the mechanism we model is not the sole determinant of the mix from moment to moment. It seems likely that transaction cost and market-timing considerations lead firms to adjust their mix at discrete intervals rather than continuously. Moreover, the distress-related, transaction cost and informational considerations that are the focus of most existing models of the mix may influence some mix decisions.
Such other factors can cause a firm to choose a mix different from our model's equilibrium value, which affects the likelihood bondholders will be exploited and thus secondary market spreads on bonds. To see the effects, let α* be our model's equilibrium share of private debt. If α < α*, so that the firm has less than the optimal amount of private debt, the firm still makes an optimal initial project choice. However, the firm and its private lenders now have greater incentives to exploit public bondholders. Because bondholders require zero expected profits ex ante they must receive higher spreads as compensation for the extra risk (Lemma 1). Two opposing effects operate when α > α * . One is the converse of the α < α * effect -holding original project choice constant, with less public debt the firm is less likely to renegotiate to riskier projects late in the game and thus spreads are lower. However, the firm is more likely to choose a riskier original project, which would tend to increase observed spreads. We cannot sign the total effect analytically, but we expect the relationship between α and interest rate spreads to be less negative for relatively high values of α. This out-of-equilibrium analysis gives us a testable hypothesis: the larger the share of private debt in total debt, the lower the spread on a firm's bonds, all else equal.
We regress borrowers' fiscal year-end interest rate spreads on fiscal year-end values of α as well as control variables for the general level of the firm's risk, which is determined by the characteristics of the firm's project choice set (X and θ in our model). Project choice set control variables include leverage, return on assets (ROA), the size of the firm, the R&D to sales ratio, the market-to-book ratio, the median rating of the firm's bonds, its industry, and the year of the observation. 24 Leverage is measured by the debt-to-assets ratio. Increases in leverage should make all debt riskier, and so increase the bond spread. ROA works in the opposite direction. The stronger a firm's earnings, the lower the spread on its bonds. Firm size, measured by the log of total assets, is a proxy for diversification. We expect that, all else equal, larger firms should have a lower spread. Firm size may also proxy for opacity. Bondholders may have more information about larger firms, and thus demand a lower spread. R&D-to-sales and market-to-book ratios are frequently used as measures of growth potential, and hence risk, implying a positive relationship with spreads (Houston and James, 1996) . 25 Higher values of these variables also reflect potential moral hazard problems. Moreover, because the leverage variable captures only the book value of equity, market-to-book in effect completes the leverage measure by adding market equity to the regression. Thus, interpretation of results for market-to-book is difficult because it is not clear whether its empirical relationship with spreads represents the effects of variations in economic leverage, variations in other sources of observable risk, or variations in moral hazard risk. We also include dummies representing the median Moody's rating of a firm's bonds. Inclusion of rating dummies is somewhat problematic because the rating agencies may be aware of any deviation of α from α * and may include in ratings the effect on the risk borne by bondholders, thus causing a collinearity problem between the rating dummies and α.
24 Industry dummies are a set of thirteen dummy variables that represent our judgmental collapsing of Fama and French's (1997) encoding of SIC codes from 49 categories to thirteen. 25 The market-to-book ratio is given by book assets less book common equity plus market common equity, divided by book assets. R&D to sales is set to zero for missing values of R&D. Houston and James (1996) and Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) .
Results of regressing interest rate spreads on the share of private debt with no controls appear in the first column of Table 4 . The coefficient on α is negative and significant, implying that more private debt is associated with a lower interest rate spread on bonds. We include all the control variables except for the market-to-book ratio in the regression reported in the second column of Table 4 . Once again, the coefficient on the share of private debt is negative and significant. The control variables have the predicted signs and are significant except for R&D to sales and a couple of the rating dummies (the omitted rating category is Aaa/Aa).
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These results imply that holding the total amount of debt constant, increasing the share of effectively senior bank debt reduces the interest rate on effectively junior bonds. This is as predicted by our model, but it the opposite of what conventional intuition and traditional models of capital structure predict.
When we include the market-to-book ratio in our regression (column 3 of Table 4 ), the sample size drops because the market value of equity is often missing in Compustat. The statistical significance of α becomes marginal in this regression, but the loss of significance is due to the drop in sample size and not to collinearity of market-to-book and α (when we run the regression on the reduced sample without market-to-book, the change in significance of α is similar; this is not shown in the table). The sign on market-to-book is consistent with interpretations in which it measures leverage rather than growth opportunities. Other specifications, not shown, yield qualitatively similar results: the coefficient on α is always negative, although for some subsamples or specifications its significance is marginal (any significance is impressive given that both the share of private debt and bond interest rate spreads are measured with error).
27
The coefficients on α also imply that mix decisions are of some economic significance in terms of pricing. Spreads are measured in percentage points and α as a fraction in the regressions 26 If we omit the rating dummies, the coefficient on α becomes more negative, as expected. 27 When we plot spreads against α (not shown), the negative relationship is apparent, but much of the slope arises because high values of spreads are not uncommon for low-α firms but are rare for high-α firms. This pattern is entirely consistent with our model -those firms with high spreads and low α may be those with α well below α * , whereas firms with α near α * tend to have spreads in the main body of the scatter.
reported in Table 4 , so the various estimates of α imply that a 0.1 change in α is on average associated with a change in spread of from four to sixteen basis points. Using the -0.636 coefficient from the second specification, a variation of α across its interquartile range (from about 0.2 to 0.6) is predicted to be associated with a 25 basis point change in spreads, large enough to get the attention of most chief financial officers. These estimates are particularly appealing because we are modeling out-of-equilibrium effects in Table 4 : The fact that rather large variations in α from an optimum value appear to be associated with moderate but temporarily bearable variations in spreads is nice. Very large estimated variations in spreads would be unappealing because they would imply firms would be continually fine-tuning their mix, whereas our empirical intuition is that firms make more discrete adjustments.
Regression Models of the Share of Private Debt in Total Debt
A key implication of our model is that, holding constant other aspects of contracting technology and opportunity sets, the greater the moral hazard risk posed by a firm the smaller the share of private debt in its total debt. Thus, given sufficient controls, in cross-section the share α should be negatively related to conventional proxy variables for moral hazard like R&D to sales or market-to-book (presuming such proxies capture at least some moral hazard not controllable by loan covenants). However, high values of such proxy variables are also often interpreted as indicative of especially opaque firms. Thus, extant results can be interpreted as supportive of models focused on adverse selection or private information. (Houston and James (1996) find a negative relationship for both variables, whereas Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) find a positive relationship for market-to-book.)
We add to the conventional list of variables two pure private information proxies. These variables should soak up any private information effects measured by the conventional proxies, leaving estimated coefficients on the latter to reflect only moral hazard. One private information variable is the adverse selection component of the firm's equity bid-ask spread as measured by Huang and Stoll (1997) . Conventional microstructure intuition argues that bid-ask spreads are a function of the market-maker's revenues and costs, and a primary cost is the adverse selection risk of transacting with an informed trader. The more opaque the firm, the larger the adverse selection risk and the higher the bid-ask spread. However, the bid-ask spread should be unaffected by moral hazard risk that the firm will expropriate wealth from its lenders.
As an alternative to Huang and Stoll's measure, we employ the estimate of equity transaction costs suggested by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) . Although their estimate includes both adverse selection and observable risk components of transaction costs, it avoids an implementation problem with Huang and Stoll's measure that causes estimated adverse selection components to be negative for many firms. Because we include proxies for borrowers' observable risk, the presence of an observable risk component in the measure should not be a serious problem.
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Using the same sample as for the spread regressions in the previous subsection, we regress α on the firm's leverage, ROA, size, R&D-to-sales ratio, market-to-book ratio, the two microstructure variables, and the same series of year, rating, and industry dummy variables used previously. Results without and with the adverse selection measures appear in Table 5 . In every case, the coefficient on our primary moral hazard proxy, R&D-to-sales, is negative and significant. 30 To the extent that the adverse selection measures soak up any private information proxy value of R&D-to-sales, the negative relationship can be interpreted as flowing purely from a moral hazard-related mechanism. Thus, the evidence is consistent with an important role for moral hazard as a determinant of the private debt share and with our model.
Both private information proxies are statistically significant, implying a role for private information in at least some firms' mix decisions. When both variables appear at the same time (not shown in the table), signs and magnitudes remain the same and both remain significant (marginally so in the case of the Lesmond-Ogden-Trzcinka variable). Because of the technical issues noted previously, we are reluctant to attach economic interpretations to results for these variables or to their opposite signs. For this paper, what is important is that a role for moral hazard remains even when the information proxies are included in the regressions.
We are also reluctant to place much interpretation on results for market-to-book. Although market-to-book is a common proxy for growth opportunities, private information, and moral hazard, it is correlated with market-based measures of leverage. Indeed, when both book leverage and market-to-book appear in a specification, the latter variable arguably represents the market 28 Large equity orders are often broken up into sequences of smaller orders for execution, which introduces serial correlation into equity transaction price data, in turn leading to negative values of the Huang and Stoll variable. A possible correction for the problem, collapse of sequences of related trades, can lead to positively biased estimates because some unrelated trades are likely to be aggregated. 29 We are grateful to David Lesmond for providing estimates of the Lesmond-Ogden-Trzcinka measure and for his advice regarding technical issues. 30 Results are robust to specification changes, such as omission of industry or rating dummies. When measures of sales growth or asset growth are added to the specification, sample size drops but all results are qualitatively unchanged. Estimated coefficients on such growth measures are positive and significant, consistent with their proxying for the arrival rate of new projects (ρ) and with comparative static results in panel A of Table 1. component of leverage. The differing signs on market-to-book in mix regressions reported by Houston and James (1996) and Krishnawamy, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) are likely due to the presence of book leverage in the Houston and James empirical model and its absence in the latter model. 31 In general, separating leverage and growth-opportunity effects is quite difficult empirically.
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Interpreting the Literature in Light of the Evidence
All the evidence is supportive of our model's assumptions and implications except perhaps the finding that the Huang and Stoll (1997) and Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) adverse selection measures have predictive power. That finding implies that private information, which we do not model, has some role in debt mix decisions. As noted previously, we believe that each of a variety of considerations probably influence at least some firms' decisions, and thus that our model (like all others) paints an incomplete picture.
However, to the best of our knowledge, each of the major existing models of the mix is inconsistent with at least some of the evidence. Most importantly, most existing models imply or assume that interest rate spreads on loans exceed those on bonds, whereas the converse appears to be true. Existing models focused on adverse selection tend to require such a relationship because otherwise there would be no reason to issue debt publicly.
Models that focus on hold-up-problems posit that banks use their private information about borrowers to extract rents, and that such firms issue some public debt to limit the hold-up problem.
If banks charge lower interest rates because compensation in the form of future rents is expected, such models might be consistent with bond spreads being higher than loan spreads. However, one example of such models, Rajan (1992) , appears to imply a positive relationship between the share of private debt and bond spreads, the opposite of what we find. 33 Moreover, it is difficult to believe that banks could hold up the large firms that are typical issuers of public debt. 31 We are grateful to Venkat Subramaniam for this point. 32 Our finding that α is positivly and significantly related to firm size and leverage also differs from Houston and James (1996) , who find a negative and significant relationship, but our sample differs importantly from theirs in that ours includes only firms with public debt outstanding. In their sample, bigger and more leveraged firms are naturally more likely to have issued some public debt, and thus in their sample α will be lower for such firms. In our sample, given that all firms have public debt, and given practical minimum public issuance amounts, public debt will be a larger fraction of small firms' debt, implying the relationship we find. 33 As we read Rajan (1992) , lenders make efficient liquidation decisions as long as some private debt appears in the capital structure, but with too much private debt the entrepreneur exerts suboptimal effort.
Thus, when α is above its optimal value, bond spreads should be higher to compensate bondholders for
Concluding Remarks
A standard explanation for the role of financial intermediaries in business lending is that they help resolve principal-agent problems between firms and investors. Much of the theoretical literature has focused on the class of agency problems involving asymmetric information. While the assumption that insiders, including inside debtholders, know more about a firm than outsiders is relevant for many firms, it is least likely to be important to the financing of the large firms that typically issue public debt. One important contribution of this paper is that it provides a model of debt mix choice that is based on incomplete contracting with no asymmetric information.
Another contribution is recognition of a previously unrecognized role for public debt: It helps
give firms incentives not to exploit the incompleteness of debt contracts. Public debtholders, by entering into debt contracts that make it difficult for them to participate in renegotiations, commit to act as a punching bag, thereby giving firms incentives to invest more efficiently.
We also provide new empirical evidence on the determinants of the mix of public and private debt at firms. Earlier studies find that riskier firms generally have more private debt, and that firms with larger problems of asymmetric information have more public debt. Our study confirms these results and also shows that firms posing larger moral hazard risks (those whose covenants are least restrictive) have less bank debt and more public debt. We provide the first evidence about the relationship between the share of private debt in total debt and bond interest rate spreads, finding a negative relationship, as predicted by our model.
the associated extra risk. Pricing implications are difficult to draw from Hadlock and James (1997) , where the mix is simply a compendium of past issuance decisions, and from Diamond (1991) , which emphasizes corner solutions for the debt mix.
Appendix A.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: The first step is to show that the derivative of V b with respect to α is larger than the derivative of V g with respect to α: there is an equilibrium where the firm chooses the best project, it is at this α. But, we need to ensure that the return at this α is greater that the return when rates are set based on the assumption that the firm will choose the bad project and the firm does so. If the firm chooses the bad project and does not switch to the new project, then it is strictly worse off then it would be under the good project since θ g X g > θ b X b and since the firm only switches from the good project to the new project if it improves returns. Also, for any realization y on the interval [0, Y] by which X is increased, the firm is better off after switching from the good project rather than the bad project:
To see this,
Thus, firm is better off with the good project in all states when it would have switched from the bad project. Hence, overall the good project has a higher expected return than the bad project if interest rates are set in anticipation of the project that it selected.
(3) The final step of the proposition is obvious. ♦ PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
The first term is positive since θ g X g > 1 and θ g > θ b .
To sign the second and third term:
We know that
, and θ ng > θ nb .
So, X g + Y -X g * > X b + Y -X b *. Along with X g * > X b *, this shows that the derivative is positive.
♦
Appendix B: Details of Calibration Used in Comparative Statics
We set (1 -θ g ), the default rate on the original (good) project, to 0.07, which corresponds to the fouryear cumulative default rate for firms rated Ba or BB. 34 In our model, a key feature of public debt is that its terms are fixed for at least as long as the maturity of the loan. Loan maturity represents the span of time during which the bank is able to exert control only if covenants are violated. Thus, to be realistic, the calibrated duration of the game should be typical of loans, but may be shorter than typical bond maturities. Four years seems reasonable because corporate loan agreements typically have original maturities of three to five years, whereas bonds typically are of longer maturity.
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The default rate for the bad project should be substantially worse than that for the good project, but still within a range realistically permissible under loan covenants. We set (1 -θ b ) to 0.235. This corresponds in terms of default probability to a one-full-grade rating downgrade.
The default rate for the new project (1-θ ng ) is 0.094, which corresponds in terms of default probability to a rating one-third of a grade below that for the good project (one +/-"tick" on the rating scale). The rate is higher than that for the good project but lower than that for the bad project. We think of new projects as moderately riskier, revenue-enhancing opportunities that become available fairly often in the normal course of a company's business, while still possibly violating covenants.
Payoffs to the projects must conform to the assumptions underlying the model and correspond to realistic rates of return on invested capital. We set X g to 2.01, corresponding to a four-year annualized internal rate of return (IRR) on an investment of 19.1 percent. The payoff for the bad project X b , which we set to 2.36, exceeds that for the good project, but to ensure an interior solution is not so large that the net present value of the bad project exceeds that of the good project plus the option to switch to the new project. Payoffs for the new project are specified as a uniform range between the original project payoff and a maximum value X i + Y. We set Y = 0.25, corresponding to a maximum good-then-new project annual IRR of 22.6 percent.
ρ captures both the chances that a higher-NPV but somewhat riskier project will become available and that renegotiation with private lenders will be required to make the project permissible. Kwan and Carleton (1993) note that covenants are modified at least once for about half of private placements, and that over 90 percent of such modifications do not involve borrower distress. Taking covenant modifications as indicative of new project opportunities requiring renegotiation, we calibrate ρ = 0.5 for both cases.
34 Moody's (1996, Table 9 ) reports average cumulative four-year default rates of 7.03 percent for firms rated Ba1. 35 As noted previously, public debt would have no realistic role if bank credit agreements had very short maturities because the bank could exercise full control (or at least reset terms) at each renewal. Statistics showing most bank loans are medium-term commitments appear in section 3.
As shown in Table B -1, the equilibrium share of bank debt is 0.55, which is close to the median value of 0.51 found by Houston and James (1996) for large corporations with public debt outstanding. Interest rate spreads and spread differentials are also realistic. Recalling that the risk-free rate is here assumed zero, and converting loan and bond payoffs to annual rates, calibrated loan and bond spreads are 183 and 213 basis points, respectively. The loan spread is that charged by the bank assuming the original (good) project is done, which was calibrated to resemble a Ba-rated credit. The bond spread is also for a Ba-rated project, but takes into account the risk that the bank and firm will later renegotiate to the riskier new 
Appendix C. Evidence on Relative Interest Rate Spreads
The statistics in Table 2 are from Table 10 of Carey (1995) , which reports comparative loan and bond spreads using a variety of measurement strategies. If anything, the statistics in Table 2 understate the extent to which Carey (1995) found bond spreads to exceed loan spreads. This appendix offers a summary description of construction of the spread difference data; see Carey (1995) for further details.
Loans were drawn from the November 1993 release of Loan Pricing Corporation's Dealscan database, which contains information on a large number of corporate loans made between 1986 and early 1993. Such information was drawn mainly from SEC filings and thus the base loan sample is representative of loans issued by firms with registered equity or debt. Bond data are from the Lehman Brothers' database (see Warga (1995) for a description), which includes month-end secondary market yields as well as maturity dates, durations, and other characteristics. Loan borrowers were matched by name with Compustat, yielding CUSIP identifiers, and these in turn were used to match loans and bonds.
Borrower ratings are for the month-end prior to loan origination and are Standard & Poor's ratings available in Compustat.
Excluded from the analysis were: loans to borrowers rated worse than B-or better than A+; loans with purposes likely to be associated with major changes in control or leverage, such as LBO loans; loans for which no suitable matching bond could be located in the Lehman database; and loans for which spreads, contract dates or maturity information was missing. A suitable matching bond was one with a quoted secondary market yield as of the end of the month preceding the loan contract date (bonds with yields based on matrix pricing models were eliminated). Where multiple matching bonds were available, puttable and callable bonds were eliminated. The final sample includes 575 loans. Median loan size is $200 million and median borrower assets $2.6 billion.
Spreads on the remaining bonds were computed and averaged, with individual bond spreads being the difference between the bond yield and the average yield on Treasuries with durations comparable to that of the corporate bond. Such bond spreads were converted to a LIBOR basis (comparable to that of the loan contract spreads) using the smoothed midpoint of daily closing spreads on standard three-year interest rate swaps, obtained from Swaps Monitor. Such swap spreads are occasionally very volatile and thus were smoothed nonparametrically to reduce noise in the resulting spread differences, but use of daily values does not qualitatively affect the results. Three-year swap spreads were used because the average loan had an original maturity of three years.
Spread differences in table 2 are the loan contract spread less the bond spread, with loan contract spreads including any annual contract fee. Any upfront fees were prorated over the life of the loan and added to the contract spread as well.
In addition to the exercise reported here, Carey (1995) reports results for various other measures and assumptions, all of which produce the same qualitative result: bond spreads are higher than loan spreads on average, or in the case of very low-risk bonds (rated A), about the same.
Table 1. Comparative Statics
Direct effect assumes that changes in a variable such as θ g have no effect on the range of projects that is renegotiated or on the interest rate on public debt. The simulation baseline values are those used in Table  B -1 (set for non-investment grade borrowers). The change in the equilibrium bank share comes from the model in Section 2 assuming (A3) holds. In Panel B, the changes in the project success probabilities hold the expected return of the appropriate project(s) constant. The mean and median differences between loan spreads and matched bond spreads are shown in basis points, with negative numbers indicating the average bond spread exceeds the loan spread. Spread differences are computed as follows: For each loan, the secondary market yields on outstanding bonds for the loan borrower, as of the contract date of the loan, is found. Spreads over Treasuries are computed by subtracting the same-day secondary-market yield on Treasuries with remaining duration similar to that of the corporate bond. This fixed-rate spread is then converted to a floating-rate, LIBOR basis using the midpoint of bid-ask spreads on 3-year interest rate swaps. Bond spreads are averaged and subtracted from the loan spread. Individual loan-bond spread differences are then averaged to obtain the results in this Interest rate spreads are regressed on the share of private debt in total debt (α) and controls for the overall risk borne by the firm's lenders. Observations are at fiscal year-end dates. Spreads are the mean difference between public bond interest rates as reported in the Lehman data and rates on comparable maturity Treasuries. Leverage is the ratio of debt to assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to assets. Rating dummy variable values are set according to the median Moody's rating of the firm's bonds at the time of the observation. Market-to-book is total book assets less book equity plus the market value of equity, all divided by book assets. Because the market value of equity is often missing in Compustat, the usable sample is smaller when market-to-book is included in the specification. Table 5 . Alpha Regressions
The share of private debt in total debt (α) is regressed on a proxy for moral hazard risk not controlled by covenants (R&D expense divided by sales), controls for the firm's project choice set, and controls for asymmetric information problems posed by the firm. The latter are the measure of the adverse selection component of the firm's equity bid-ask spread suggested by Huang and Stoll (1997) and the measure of equity transaction costs suggested by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) . Observations are at fiscal year-end dates. Leverage is the ratio of debt to assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to assets. Rating dummy variable values are set according to the median Moody's rating of the firm's bonds at the time of the observation. Market-to-book is total book assets less book equity plus the market value of equity, all divided by book assets. The firm chooses α, the proportion of debt obtained from banks.
Debt contracts are signed with banks and public bondholders at interest rates R g and P, respectively.
Date 1
The firm chooses whether to undertake the bad project or the good project.
Date 2 With probability ρ, the firm has the opportunity to switch to a new project.
To switch to the new project, the firm must renegotiate its bank loan contract by offering a new interest rate R n .
The bank either accepts the new interest rate, allowing the switch, or the firm cannot switch projects. Plotted are the expected return to the firm from each of three possible project choices and for each value of the share of private debt in total debt (α), using the calibrated model as specified in Appendix B.
Equilibrium α is where the upper two lines intersect. Expected returns to the bad project when the good project is expected for α greater than the equilibrium value are not incentive compatible and thus are not attainable by the firm. The bottom line is the return on the bad project when market participants expect the bad project to be selected. 
